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ABSTRACT
This article explores the idea of ‘Milah Abraham’, a term used and
advocated by Ahmad Mushaddeq and Mahful Muis, the founders of
Gafatar (Gerakan Fajar Nusantara/Archipelagic Dawn Movement).
Mahful Muis, a prominent companion of Mushaddeq, has written
many works about the idea of the religion of Abraham. This article
answers the questions of how the idea of Milah Abraham emerged,
and what are the implications of its emergence in the context of
plural Indonesian Islam. Based on interviews and the written works
of both Gafatar leaders, this study explores the idea of the religion
of Abraham and how it can go beyond Judaism, Christianity and
Islam to a new spirituality that combines the three religious
traditions. The idea of Milah Abraham not only oﬀers a new
syncretism in the context of plural Indonesian Islam, but also
challenges the establishment of Islamic orthodoxy in the country.
Since the 1970s, the idea of returning to the religion of Abraham
has contributed to the discussion of pluralism among many
Indonesian Muslim intellectuals.
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Introduction
The archipelago of Indonesia is home to a Muslim majority population. However, the way
Islam is practised there has been deeply aﬀected by a complex and dynamic history of cultural
diversity, which distinguishes Indonesian Islam from Islam in other parts of the world (Geertz
1968; Ricklefs 1981, 2006, 2007; Hefner 1985; Woodward 2011, 1989; Makin 2016c). Histor-
ians, sociologists and anthropologists have documented the uniqueness of Islam in Indonesia,
where the integration of religion with diverse local cultures creates unique and diverse Islamic
practices, as is seen in rituals, social movements and styles of architecture. The authoritarian
Suharto regime, commonly known as the ‘New Order’, fell in 1998, and was followed by the
‘reform period’ (masa reformasi), when the diversity of Indonesian Islam entered a new phase
in which the country has faced a growing phenomenon of religious orthodoxy and conserva-
tism.1 Some conservative Islamic ideologies that were silenced by Suharto during his 32 years
in power gained popularity during the open era of democratization (Fealy 2004; Hefner 2010,
2008; Feillard and Madinier 2011; Makin 2015, 2016b, 2016e, 2017a).
During Indonesia’s political and economic crisis in 1998, many Indonesians claimed to
have received divine messages and attracted a considerable number of followers with
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whom the claimants to prophethood have formed religious groups (Makin 2016a, 2017b,
2010). These movements can be classiﬁed as New Religious Movements (NRMs), some of
which have also emerged in the more secularized societies of Europe, America and Asia
(Barker 1999; McDaniel 2010), where religion is privatized, in response to modernization
and globalization. These NRMs oﬀer an alternative spirituality to people in Europe and
America, where the role of public religion has been assumed to be in decline (Dawson
1998a, 1998b; Mayer 2011). However, the assumption that the role of religion would
decline in our twenty-ﬁrst century globalized world has been questioned. In many
Muslim countries, it is common to display religious piety in public and religion is experi-
encing a resurgence in politics (Hefner 2008, 2010). Peter Berger (2008) is perhaps right in
coining the word ‘desecularization’ to refer to the resurgence of religion in the twenty-ﬁrst
century. All in all, the NRMs in the Indonesian Muslim community came into being as a
response to, and critique of, the hegemonic process of Islamization, in which Islamic
orthodoxy gained authority in the public domain. Scholarly discussion of NRMs in Indo-
nesia is still rare (McDaniel 2010; Makin 2016a), particularly discussions focusing on the
new developments in Islamic religiosity during Indonesia’s reform period.
During this reform period, two opposing movements emerged: radical and conservative
Islamic groups and NRMs. While the radicals intended to universalize their truth claims
by returning to the literal reading of Islamic sources – the Qur’an and Sunna (traditions of
the Prophet) – and absolutist Islamic religiosity (Makin 2017a), the NRMs wanted to
create a new spirituality and religiosity that combined divergent religious teachings
such as Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism and local traditions.
However, the radical groups accused the NRMs of deviating from true Islam (Ariﬁn
2008; Hosen 2012; Burhani 2014; Fenwick 2014), and the NRMs responded by criticizing
both Islam and radicals. Lia Eden, for instance, has criticized the practice of radical and
conservative Islam in Indonesia, claiming that it is problematic (Makin 2016a).
After the collapse of the New Order, in the midst of a political and economic crisis,
many NRMs became millenarian or Mahdist, oﬀering salvation and promising to
salvage Indonesian society from an imminent doomsday. The Qiyadah Islamiyah,
founded by Ahmad Mushaddeq and Mahful Muis, and which later become Komar
(Komunitas Milah Abaraham/Abrahamic Religion Community) and Gafatar (Gerakan
Fajar Nusantara/Archipelagic Dawn Movement), was this type of NRM. The Gafatar
promised the renewal of Islamic religious tradition in Indonesia via Mushaddeq’s claim
to be a prophet and Messiah who would save Indonesia and Muslims from destruction.
However, the prophetic claim not only sparked controversy but also challenged Islamic
orthodoxy as understood by the Ulama Council of Indonesia (Majelis Ulama Indonesia;
MUI) and the MUI received support from the government to prosecute the movement’s
leaders. In 2008, Mushaddeq was brought to court, tried and jailed.
This article examines the works and actions of both Mushaddeq and Mahful Muis, the
founders of the Gafatar group or Qiyadah Islamiyah. The former counts as the founding
father, while the latter nurtures the ideology and serves as an intellectual resource for
Mushaddeq and the group. Mushaddeq’s charisma has led many Indonesians to join
his group and believe in his prophethood. He is a talented organizer and uses his oratorical
skills to keep the faith of the members united, speaking eloquently and convincingly to
group members. Mahful, on the other hand, uses his knowledge of both classical and
modern Arabic sources to write about the group’s ideology. Oftentimes, Mushaddeq
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dictates ideas and Mahful reﬁnes them and sets them down in writing. Their collaboration
has produced some innovative ideas, chief among them being ‘Milah Abraham’, a term
they themselves chose and which they use to call upon their followers to return to the reli-
gion of Abraham, the forefather of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Two of the questions
this article considers are: How did the idea of Milah Abraham emerge? And what are the
implications of its emergence in the context of the pluralistic Islam of Indonesia? To
answer these questions, the article will present the biographies of the two leaders of the
movement and discuss the movement’s development to become the Gafatar. It will
shed light on the movement’s core idea, Milah Abraham, and show how this idea can con-
tribute to the discussion of pluralism in an Indonesian context.2
Two leading proponents of Milah Abraham
Ahmad Mushaddeq, whose original name is Abdussalam, was born on 21 April 1944 in
Jakarta and received his education there. He ﬁnished elementary school in 1957,
teacher training (SGA/Sekolah Guru A) in 1960, and higher level teacher training
(SGB/Sekolah Guru B) in 1963. Mushaddeq has been interested in both sports and religion
since his youth. In 1971, he graduated from the Sports Academy (STO/Sekolah Tinggi
Olah Raga) with a ﬁnal assignment paper on badminton and was then employed as a
civil servant in the Ministry of Sport (1971–1999). His most notable sporting achievement
was as a national badminton coach in 1990–1994. An indication of Mushaddeq’s interest
in religion is his membership of HUDA (Himpunan Usaha Dakwah/Association of
Islamic Call), which he headed from 1984 to 1987. Between 1987 and 1997, Mushaddeq
was active in an Islamist organization called NII (Negara Islam Indonesia/Islamic State
of Indonesia), serving as a recruiter (mudabbir/Koordinator Wilayah) for Region 9. The
aim of NII was to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia (Muis, Abdussalam, and
Cahya 2017b, 3). Mushaddeq has two wives. With the ﬁrst wife, Waginem, he has four
children, and with the second, Michela Chika Ananda, he has a daughter.
Mushaddeq’s career as a badminton coach gave him economic success but he was
always curious about religious matters. He consulted many religious leaders, but the
rabbis, Christian priests and Islamic scholars all disappointed him. The leader of NII,
Panji Gumilang, also failed to satisfy his thirst for religious knowledge, so he left the organ-
ization. Eventually, he sought his own way to satisfy his curiosity, by studying the Qur’an
himself. After a long search, he found enlightenment when he arrived at an understanding
of the ‘right path’ (sirāt ̣al-mustaqīm [Q 1.6]; Muis, Abdussalam, and Cahya 2017b, 4). His
and Mahful’s works stress how important it is to ﬁnd the right path to approach religion.
For Mushaddeq, the right path consists not of performing rituals, such as prayers ﬁve
times a day or fasting during the month of Ramadan, as most Muslims understand it,
but rather of ﬁnding a true understanding of the role religion can play in society.
In 2001, he founded an Islamic group called Qiyadah Islamiyah. The Qiyadah was suc-
cessful in attracting followers and the membership grew to more than 41,000, spread
across many provinces of Indonesia (Komaruddin 2008, 36; Muhsonef 2008, 24).3 Cak
Momo, an important Qiyadah leader, estimates the number at as many as 58,000.4 In
its early stages, the Qiyadah, like many other religious groups in the archipelago, was
simply an Islamic group concerned with the many important moral duties of Muslims,
with a particular focus on understanding and contextualizing Islam in the current
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Indonesian situation. The group advocated the reform of Islam by oﬀering a more contex-
tualized interpretation of the Qur’an, appropriate for modern circumstances. Indonesia
has a long tradition of reciting the Scripture as a vital part of prayers and rituals, in
which recitation may become merely an art (Denny 1989; Rasmussen 2001, 2005), but
the group’s followers are critical of the many Muslims who recite the Qur’an without
understanding its meaning.
However, in 2006 Mushaddeq declared himself to be a Messiah and prophet. He asked
his followers to accept his claim and testify: ‘There is no God but God and the Messiah
(Mushaddeq) is the messenger of God.’ For him, Islamic rituals, such as prayers and
fasting, are not obligatory for as long as the government of Indonesia remains inﬁdel
(Majelis Ulama Indonesia 2016), since Indonesia’s secular system is incompatible with
the Islamic system that the Qiyadah wants to establish. For Mushaddeq, any Muslims
who live under the rule of an inﬁdel government, such as the Indonesian government,
are not obliged to perform Islamic rituals. This idea attracted media attention and was
considered a threat to the Islamic orthodox establishment in the country. Due to this
claim, the MUI branded the Qiyadah as deviant (sesat), and demanded that the govern-
ment of Indonesia disband the group and outlaw its teachings (Majelis Ulama Indonesia
2011). This led to the persecution and prosecution of Qiyadah leaders and members, and
public controversy over Mushaddeq’s prophethood and his teachings continues to today.
The second important proponent of Milah Abraham after Mushaddeq is Mahful Muis.
He has two other pen-names: Mahful M. Hawary and Mahful Muis Tumanurung. He was
born in Tonasa Sulawesi on 14 July 1975. Unlike Mushaddeq, who has no formal religious
education, Mahful was educated in religious institutions from elementary to university
level. He went to a traditional boarding school run by DDI (Dewan Dakwah Islam/
Islamic Call Council) in Mangkoso Sulawesi from elementary to high school. He earned
a BA and MA from IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negeri/Islamic State Institute) Syarif
Hidayatullah, which later became UIN (Universitas Islam Negeri/Islamic State University).
At the time when I interviewed him in Cipinang prison, Mahful was still ﬁnishing his dis-
sertation for that university. He also still serves as a lecturer at the UIN Alaudin Makasar
and STAI (Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam/Islamic High Education) DDI Pangkep, Sulawesi.
While studying for his BA, he was the head of the students’ senate in 1998–1999. In many
religious groups founded by Mushaddeq such as Qiyadah Islamiyah, Komar and Gafatar,
Mahful has always played a critical role in management and leadership (Muis, Abdussa-
lam, and Cahya 2017b, 1–2). In 2017, both men were sentenced to ﬁve years’ imprison-
ment and I met and interviewed them in Cipinang prison. Whereas in the eyes of his
followers Mushaddeq is a charismatic spiritual leader, Mahful has extensive knowledge
of theology and history of religions. The combination of the two has been eﬀective in
attracting followers and managing the organization. We now turn to the development
of the group under its many names.
Transformations of the group
According to his own testimony, after 40 years of searching for religious truth and spiri-
tuality, joining many Islamic organizations, and meeting many religious leaders and scho-
lars, Mushaddeq found the ‘truth’ by himself, after which he founded the Qiyadah,
attracting thousands of members across the Indonesian archipelago. The organization is
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well managed and has a systematic structure and recruitment process. It uses a multi-level
marketing strategy. The organization’s many levels, its board and organizing committees
are well deﬁned, each with its speciﬁc tasks and responsibilities. From the lowest to the
highest level, each has a speciﬁc name and a leader entrusted with speciﬁc duties and auth-
ority. Meetings are held regularly in various cities. To meet the members of the Qiyadah,
Mushaddeq often visited Medan, Yogyakarta, Padang, Batam and Makasar, where the
number of the members grew.5
From 2001 to 2006, the Qiyadah’s teaching had a modernist Islamic tendency aimed at
the puriﬁcation of Islam.6 The followers of the Qiyadah were called upon to consistently
adhere to Islamic theology and observe Islamic teachings.7 In a booklet published in 2002,
they are repeatedly reminded to honour the doctrine of tawḥīd (the oneness of God)
(Mushaddeq 2007a, 32) and perform Islamic prayers (35), and women are told to wear
Islamic dress (such as the hijab) (39). Every member of the Qiyadah was also asked to
declare a mīthāq (contract or vow), promising to heed the advice of, and be guided by,
senior members or leaders assigned by the Qiyadah board (Katib [Ahmad Mushaddeq]
2006, 96; Mushaddeq 2007b). At this stage, the Qiyadah had a vibrant Islamic mission
(daʿwa), like many other modernist Islamic organizations in the country.
A change of direction took place in 2006, however, after Mushaddeq received enlighten-
ment and declared himself a Mahdi (Messiah) and crowned himself with a new title
Abdussalam Messi (servant of peace and the Messiah). All members of the Qiyadah were
asked to declare allegiance before the Mahdi and state: ‘There is no god but God, and the
promised Mahdi is the messenger of God.’ The simple testimony to the prophethood of
Mushaddeq also led to a change in the rituals among the Qiyadah’s members. Islamic
prayers and fasting during the month of Ramadan are no longer obligatory for
members,8 who are required instead to perform night prayers and sạdaqa (almsgiving).
In addition, they believe in the mission brought by the Mahdi to transform their society
in order to live and achieve a divine goal and they hold to that mission’s ideal values.
During this stage, they believed that they had an important divine duty, that is da‘wah
jahran (public mission), by which they mean to recruit more members and spread divine
messages of reformation in society. Their ﬁnal goal is to establish the umm al-qurā, the
capital city of Islam in Indonesia, in emulation of the Medina city–state founded by the
Prophet Muhammad in the seventh-century in the Hijaz. Mahful has argued on many
occasions that God still sends messages to human beings and he rejects the conventional
interpretation of khātam according to which Muslims ﬁrmly hold that Muhammad is
the last prophet, and no prophet will come after him. According toMahful, ‘The gate of pro-
phethood and messengerhood remains open after Muhammad, an [open] prophethood
which will bring the second version of Madinah al-Munawwarah into life, that is the
Islamic caliphate’ (Hawary 2009, 133). Since Mushaddeq’s declaration that he is the
Mahdi, according to members of the Qiyadah, the world has fallen into darkness. When
the glorious caliphate of Baghdad was destroyed by the Mongols in the thirteenth
century, the Islamic caliphate ended. The caliphate should be re-established in Indonesia
in order to carry out the mission of divine truth. Mushaddeq believes that the Ottoman
Turkish caliphate never represented the succession of Islamic power after the Abbasids.
In fact, Mushaddeq recalls that colonialism and imperialism prevailed in the Muslim
world for centuries. Now it is time to awaken the community of believers (umma) and to
make Nusatara (the archipelago of Indonesia) the capital and centre of Islamic power.9
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The Qiyadah movement attracted students in many cities. However, this sparked con-
troversy in Indonesia, as Islamic orthodoxy during the reform period was growing
robustly. Various media, including newspapers, magazines, television and the Internet,
spread the news about the establishment of a new religion by a new prophet from
Jakarta (Zainuri 2008). In 2007, the MUI responded by issuing a religious edict ( fatwā)
from the MUI’s oﬃce in Yogyakarta, as the movement had recruited thousands of univer-
sity students there and the city had become an important centre of Qiyadah activity (Muh-
sonef 2008). The national board of the MUI strengthened the Yogyakarta fatwa, which
branded the Qiyadah as deviant. The MUI also called on the government to disband
the group (Majelis Ulama Indonesia 2011). This fatwā motivated angry mobs in many
cities of Indonesia to persecute the group and the police in many cities put Qiyadah
members under surveillance. In Yogyakarta, some Qiyadah leaders were interrogated,
while Mushaddeq went to a police oﬃce in Jakarta for his own safety. In 2008, he was
tried in South Jakarta under the 1965 blasphemy law and was sentenced to four years
in jail, but this was reduced to two-and-a-half years following an appeal to the High
Court (Muis, Abdussalam, and Cahya 2017b, 5). While Mushaddeq was under arrest
and in jail, some leaders and members were forced by the MUI to recant and return to
mainstream Islam.
Meanwhile, Mahful was actively encouraging the remaining members of the Qiyadah to
change its name to Komar (Komunitas Milah Abraham/Religion of Abraham Commu-
nity), which it did in 2009. In the late Qiyadah period, the members had mostly been
asked to believe in Mushaddeq as the Mahdi, Messiah and prophet, but then, during
the Komar period, Mushaddeq and Mahful called on them to return to the religion of
Abraham. Mushaddeq took the role of spiritual advisor, but was not directly involved
in the management and leadership of the organization (Muis, Abdussalam, and Cahya
2017b, 5).
In 2011, the group took another name: Gafatar (Gerakan Fajar Nusantara/Archipelagic
Dawn Movement), still led by Mahful (Eks Pengurus Gafatar 2015, 1). In 2012, Mushad-
deq’s son, Andry Cahya, was involved in the leadership (Muis, Abdussalam, and Cahya
2017b, 6). Gafatar recruited a large number of members, who performed migration
(hijrah) to many provinces of Indonesia, such as in Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara and ulti-
mately Kalimantan, to cultivate unused land. But this led to another controversy. The
MUI issued another fatwā pinpointing the group as nothing but another transformation
of the deviant Qiyadah (Majelis Ulama Indonesia 2016). In 2016, the government banned
Gafatar (Kementrian Agama Republik Indonesia 2016) and the three leaders were brought
to trial in East Jakarta on charges of blasphemy (Kejaksaan Negeri Jakarta Timur 2016). In
March 2017, Mahful and Mushaddeq were each sentenced to ﬁve years in jail, and Cahya
to three years.
Returning to the religion of Abraham
Since 2007, both Mushadddeq and Mahful have called upon their followers on many
occasions to return to the root of the true religion sent by God to Abraham, which they
called Milah Abraham. They argue that, since Abraham, God has communicated with
messengers and prophets, to whom He sent true messages to guide human beings to
the true path (al-sirāt ̣ al-mustaqīm). According to Mushaddeq and Mahful, all prophets
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mentioned in the Bible and the Qur’an embraced, and called upon their followers to
embrace, the religion of Abraham. Not only is the religion older than the traditions of
Judaism, Christianity and Islam, but it is also the most inclusive, encompassing all
three major Semitic religions. Furthermore, God appointed Abraham as the forefather
of all prophets.10
Both Mushaddeq and Mahful allege that the three religions, Judaism, Christianity and
Islam, have deviated from the true Milah and therefore have failed to address the problems
currently facing humanity. According to Mushaddeq,11 Judaism today is nothing but a
broken branch (cabang yang patah), by which he means that the people of Israel have
gone astray. He emphasizes that the Jews are no longer committed to the principle of
tawḥīd (oneness of God), the most important teaching of Abraham, and says that some
Jews are committed to a merely human secular system of law and lordship, as the majority
of them have embraced secularism (Hawary 2009, 152–153). Christians too have deviated
from Abraham’s true religion, as they hold the doctrine of trinity, not the oneness of God.
Mahful contends that the theology of Christianity has deviated from Jesus’s true teachings
and argues that all the prophets, including Jesus and Moses, taught the Milah Abraham to
their followers. Nowadays, however, Christianity follows the teachings of St Paul, who
introduced various innovations, such as the doctrine of ancestral or original sin, and
the divinity of Jesus (Hawary 2009, 178).
Islam and Islamic civilization, on the other hand, have declined and thus been mocked
by non-Muslim nations in the same way as the Israelites were humiliated during the time
of Nebuchadnezzar. Mushaddeq says:
Today the community of Muslims has fallen into darkness and has been mocked by other
[non-Muslim] nations. The Muslims’ fate is similar to that of the Israelites during the
time of Nebuchadnezzar. Today we see that the Muslim community cries for help. (Katib
[Ahmad Mushaddeq] 2006, 94)
Mushaddeq reinterprets the word sunnatullah (God’s law), by which he means the tra-
dition of God (tradisi Tuhan) (Muhdats [Ahmad Mushaddeq] 2007, 12–13). This tra-
dition can be found in human history, when God sent numerous prophets or
messengers to warn various peoples in various places at various times, whenever the
people forgot the Milah Abraham. Mushaddeq goes further, saying that, throughout
human history, the Milah Abraham and evil forces have always competed and the truth
was not always victorious, with each taking turns to control human affairs for about
700 years. During the time of Abraham, for example, the arrogant and wicked king
Namrudz/Nimrod ruled the world. Likewise, during the time of Moses, who restored
the Milah Abraham, Pharaoh ruled the world. However, 700 years after that, the wise
King Solomon ruled the people. History then changed. Those who followed the Milah
Abraham were defeated and dominated by inﬁdel rulers including Nebuchadnezzar of
Babylonia, Koresh of Persia, Alexander of Greece and Herod of Rome. God then sent
Jesus and Muhammad to reestablish the kingdom of God (khilāfa). However, followers
of both those prophets transgressed God’s law and committed sins, so God punished
them by sending more wicked rulers, such as the Mongols who devastated the Abbasids
and brought the dynasty down, and centuries of Western colonialism that caused suffering
in the Muslim world.
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In the aftermath of colonialism, Mushaddeq believes that the Milah Abraham and
God’s kingdom should be reestablished nowhere but in the Indonesian archipelago. The
Bible mentions some Israelite messengers, while the Qur’an adds some Arab messengers.
Mushaddeq believes that Indonesia is also a place for prophets. Mushaddeq refers to God’s
messengers in Indonesia, such as Sabdo Palon Naya Genggong (1453–1478)12 and Rong-
gowarsito (1802–1873).13 He prophesies that the rise of Milah Abraham will take place in
Indonesia, which will become the centre of civilization guided by God to His path.14
Mushaddeq and Mahful base their faith, theology and interpretation of human history
and prophets on reading the Old and New Testaments and the Qur’an. Their conclusions
challenge Islamic orthodoxy and the rise of conservatism in Indonesia. Many conservative
Islamic groups have called upon Muslims to return to the two sources of Islam, the Qur’an
and Sunna (Muhammad’s tradition), but the two leaders of Milah Abraham quote numer-
ous verses from both the Old and New Testaments. To explain the identity of Abraham,
for example, they read the book of Genesis and other verses in the Old Testament. Like-
wise, in explaining Moses, Daniel and other Hebrew prophets, both refer to stories taken
from the Scripture. Mushaddeq’s knowledge of the Christian tradition is not surprising, as
he was friend of Robert P. Walean from Menado, a minister of the Gereja Masehi Advent
Hari Ketujuh (Seventh Day Adventist Church) who wrote a book about Milah Abraham
(Walean 2006). They had intensive discussions at Walean’s house in Jakarta. Walean also
cited not only the Bible but also the Qur’an in explaining the term ḥanīf or Milah
Abraham. He explains the identity of Abraham, for instance, by reference to Q 16.123,
Q 23.53, Romans 4.16 and Ezekiel 22.26–28 (8). Interestingly, Mushaddeq refers to the
same biblical and qur’anic verses (Katib [Ahmad Mushaddeq] 2006, 13 and 19).
According to Mushaddeq, each prophet has a covenant (perjanjian) with God.
Abraham has the oldest covenant, a contract between the prophet, God and his people.
The most famous covenant is that of Moses, based upon which the First Temple was
built in Jerusalem. But human beings forgot the true teaching of the covenant, and the
city was destroyed. Afterwards, Mushaddeq writes, God sent Jesus, after whom the
Second Temple was built. It seems that Mushaddeq’s reading of history misunderstands
the fact that the second temple was built in the sixth century BCE and destroyed after
Jesus in 70 CE. Be that as it may, Mushaddeq continues that, like the First Temple, the
Second Temple was also destroyed. God then sent Muhammad who successfully
renewed the covenants of the previous prophets and messengers and built Darussalam/
the abode of peace (spanning from the time from the Medina of the Prophet to the
Baghdad of the Abbasids). As Mushaddeq puts it:
The law of God will never cease until the end of Islamic glory [initially] built by the Prophet
Muhammad [lasting until] the thirteenth century CE. According to the law of God, the
struggle between His kingdom and that of evil, the world of peace and that of wickedness,
truth and falsehood, light and darkness, never ceases. As such it will continue into the
next thousands or millions of years. (Messi [Ahmad Mushaddeq] 2011, 552–553)
However, the people of the prophets forgot these covenants. Jews, Christians and Muslims
have gone astray and forgotten the true teachings of the religion of Abraham. Mushaddeq
likens the backwardness and moral decadence of people today to living in a hell. Muslims
today are being left behind by the more developedWestern world and are morally corrupt,
because the Muslim world has deviated from the true religion of Abraham, and this has
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prevented Muslims from progressing or being able to compete economically with the
Western world. Mushaddeq remarks:
We are talking about the Muslim community; if there is a Muslim who becomes smart and
successful, it is only a personal achievement and is not caused by his Islamic theology. In fact,
the Muslim community today everywhere is a subject of ridicule and mockery in the world, a
symbol of backwardness and stupidity, and is seen as a latent danger [to the world order].
However, both the Christian and Jewish communities have also gone astray. (Muhdats
[Ahmad Mushaddeq] 2007, 169).
Mushaddeq goes further and claims that when the Darussalam/abode of peace (Baghdad)
was destroyed, Islamic authority (the caliphate) disappeared and Muslim leaders failed to
return to the religion of Abraham. During colonial times, Western rulers arrested and
jailed these leaders. The crisis hampering most of the Muslim world today, Mushaddeq
argues, is that God also has annulled the spirit of the Qur’an. A thousand years after
the destruction of Islamic civilization and the fall of Baghdad, the Abbasid capital, the
spirit of the Qur’an has expired.15 Mushaddeq believes that he has been sent by God as
the Messiah, whose duty is to call upon all the people of the world to return to the cove-
nant of Abraham. Through this divine task, he will restore not only Islam but also the
teachings of Jesus, Moses and, ultimately, Abraham. He says:
The task of the Messiah is to restore Jerusalem, which should become the light of God, a just
city, where the house of God on Mount Sion above all mountains of all nations [was estab-
lished], as was done by Jesus Christ. (Muhdats [Ahmad Mushaddeq] 2007, 80)
In 2007, after meditating for 40 days on the hill of Bunder near Bogor, Mushaddeq
received God’s revelation. Momo told me that during that time Mushaddeq built a hut
in the middle of a rice ﬁeld to avoid the crowds by withdrawing (taḥannuth). Food and
drink were sent to him regularly.16 Both Mushaddeq and Momo told me that the
Prophet Muhammad practised this taḥannuth in the cave of Hira, after which he was
appointed as a God’s messenger. Similarly, after performing this ritual, Mushaddeq was
appointed as a Messiah and messenger of God in the same way as Muhammad, Jesus,
Moses and Abraham. Mushaddeq’s main mission is to restore both God’s religion and
civilization and to guide human beings to the true path. He states:
During my contemplation on the hill of Bunder, I received many revelations from God,
which I am delivering to you all. All advice that you have learned from me should be
heeded and obeyed; and you should therefore testify that all is truth coming from God
through His messenger. (Muhdats [Ahmad Mushaddeq] 2007, 184)
In claiming divinity and prophethood, Mushaddeq seeks legitimacy through his interpret-
ation of the Old and New Testaments and the Qur’an. One of his most important teach-
ings is belief in his own prophethood. On this he states:
Thus, the awaited Messiah will rely on the Qur’an as a means to pave the way to the right
path, and all believers should follow the awaited Messiah, because he receives knowledge
of the Qur’an (revelation) from God. He will lead human beings under the guidance of
the Qur’an consistently. (Muhdats [Ahmad Mushaddeq] 2007, 187)
During the early period of the Qiyadah, the mission for most followers was carried out in
clandestine ways (daʿwa sirran). In the next phase of the mission, daʿwa jahran (declara-
tion of the mission in public) took place, which included the declaration of the promised
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Messiah (al-masīḥ al-mawʿūd) in public. The most important teaching in the third phase is
hijra (migration) to other lands in order to establish umm al-qurā (the capital city of the
caliphate) and themadīna munawwara (the city that shines), which will become the centre
of world civilization (Muis, Abdussalam, and Cahya 2017a, 99–111). What Mushaddeq
means by the centre of civilization is Nusantara (the Indonesian archipelago). Under
the new organization, Gafatar, he called upon his followers to ﬁnd and purchase land
in the archipelago where he would turn the mission of establishing the umm al-qurā
into reality. The followers of Gafatar then implemented this call by migrating to Papua,
Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara, and ﬁnally to Kalimantan. However, the government was suspi-
cious of any possible clandestine plan to rebel against the government, so they were
expelled from many of these places. From Kalimantan they were sent back home to
Java and Sumatra. Their leaders were further investigated and some were arrested (Eks
Gafatar 2017).
Mushaddeq and Mahful believe that the people of Nusantara are the descendants of
Abraham and his third wife Kentura,17 who established various kingdoms in the archipe-
lago: Tarumanegara in Banten,18 Kandis 19 and Melayu in Jambi,20 Sriwijaya in Palem-
bang,21 Tulang Bawang in Lampung,22 Perlak23 and Samudera Pasai in Aceh,24
Panjalu,25 Singasari26 and Majapahit27 in East Java, Demak and Mataram in Central
Java, Wajo and Goa-Tallo in South Sulawesi, Ternate, and the sultanates of Solo and
Yogyakarta.28 Mushaddeq asserts that colonial and modern historians hide these accounts
by manipulating the history of Nusantara. For Mushaddeq, Majapahit, and all of the
above-mentioned kingdoms, were not Hindu kingdoms as historians claim, but kingdoms
that honoured the religion of Abraham and followed the path of the biblical and qur’anic
prophets (Muis, Abdussalam, and Cahya 2017a, 156).
Mushaddeq believes that his prophetic mission is to awaken the Nusantara for the next
generation. Another prophecy he made is that his prophetic mission would be accom-
plished in 2024.29 He also believes that he is a messenger from God not only for Indone-
sians but also for the whole world with its centre in Nusantara, which will succeed
Baghdad’s caliphate in ruling the world. Mushaddeq also recalls that Nusantara was glor-
ious in the past, with its high point during the kingdom of Majapahit. After its fall the
archipelago was ruled by Dutch, British and Japanese colonial governments. He believes
that it is time to rise up and establish the glory of Nusantara once more for the rest of
the world (Muis, Abdussalam, and Cahya 2017a, 160–161).
A new syncretism and its contribution to Indonesian Islamic pluralism
The rise of Gafatar with the idea of returning to the religion of Abraham contributes to
another dimension to the plurality of Indonesian Islam. Since the 1960s, many researchers
have seen the potential of the pluralism found in many local practices of syncretism, refer-
ring to the way in which Islam and local cultures and traditions meet and mingle (Geertz
1960, 1968, 1983; Hefner 1985; Makin 2016d).30 Islam in Java, for example, features some
unique syncretic practices, such as ways of sharing in a communal meal (slametan)
(Woodward 1988; Beatty 1996; van den Boogert 2017). Islam has interacted with and
assimilated some elements of Hinduism and Buddhism, which came to the archipelago
before Islam (Makin 2016c). Islam’s assimilation and accommodation of Hindu and Bud-
dhist elements can be seen in various architectural styles of mosques in Java, such as
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Kudus or Demak (Budi 2004; Roesmanto 2013; Sucitra 2015; Supatmo 2016). In addition,
various genres of Javanese literature, such as serat (letter) and babad (chronicle), contain
some indications of the Islamization of Hindu and Buddhist traditions (Makin 2016d).
Other islands in the archipelago present other examples of syncretism between Islam
and unique local cultures, such as Lombok island with its wetu telu Islamic tradition,
which incorporates the Hindu-Buddhist and traditional culture of Sasak, a local ethnic tra-
dition in the island. The followers of the wetu telu pray three times a day instead of ﬁve, as
indicated in its name wetu telu (three times). Nor do they fast the whole month of
Ramadan, but only three days. This practice is marginalized, however, because of the
strong wave of Islamization in the archipelago (Budiwanti 2000). In addition, Indonesia
is home to hundreds of local religions, which the government calls aliran kepercayaan
(sects), and which have also developed various syncretic practices with parts of ‘oﬃcial’
religions and local beliefs and traditions (Makin 2016a, 2017b). However, the Milah
Abraham as taught by Mushaddeq and Mahful presents a new attempt to combine
Islam, Christianity and Judaism.
Mushaddeq’s and Mahful’s attempt to accommodate two older religious traditions,
however, remains textual, based on verses of the Old and New Testaments. They do
not have any knowledge, experience or involvement with particular Christian churches
or Jewish traditions. Apart from reading the two Testaments, they have both only met
with one Christian minister to learn about Christianity, and they fail to mention any
Jewish rabbi, as there is no visible presence of Judaism in Indonesia. All in all, their
attempt to accommodate the two older religions may be seen as a new model of
syncretism.
However, the combination of Islam, Christianity and Judaism through reading the Old
and New Testaments is not entirely new in the archipelago. The Malim religion in
Sumatra, which emerged in the early twentieth century, exhibits this accommodation in
its theology, rituals and prayers (Makin 2016a, 146–150, 2017b, 217–224). In addition,
the Malims continue to embrace Batak local culture. It can be argued that the religion
of Abraham as proposed by Mushaddeq is a step forward, as both Mushaddeq and
Mahful read and quote the Bible and the Qur’an throughout their arguments in defence
of Mushaddeq’s prophethood and they give accounts of some prophets based on the
Old and New Testaments and the Qur’an. It is noteworthy that, after the reform
period, the two NRMs that have been the most successful at surviving and recruiting
members are Salamullah led by Lia Eden and Gafatar led by Mushaddeq. Interestingly,
both movements clearly include some elements of other Scriptures in their theological
positions. Compared to Mushaddeq, Lia accommodates more religious traditions, includ-
ing Hindu, Buddhist and Chinese traditions (Makin 2016a). This model of syncretism was
ﬁrst introduced during the reform period.
It should be noted that some Indonesian intellectuals also promote the term Milah
Abraham in their eﬀort to promote tolerance between Christianity and Islam in the
country. They aim at ﬁnding similar roots and historical legitimacy in the two religions
in order to increase understanding and solidarity among the followers of both (Kersten
2016, 228 and 235; Munawar-Rachman 2010, 542; Sirry 2004, 17–61). However, the
calls for a return to Milah Abraham by the intellectuals and by Mushaddeq are
diﬀerent. The intellectuals do not intend to incorporate the three religions into their theo-
logy or faith, whereas Mushaddeq boldly blends the three into a new faith.
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Mushaddeq’s concept of Milah Abraham contributes to the understanding of religious
pluralism in Indonesia. Since the New Order, progressive Indonesian Muslim scholars,
including scholars in Yogyakarta and Jakarta, have related Indonesia’s pluralism to secu-
larism, tolerance and liberalism (Makin 2017c). They interpret ‘pluralism’ in at least three
ways. First, the adherents of a religious tradition should appreciate the truth in other reli-
gions. Second, they teach inclusive theology, by which they preserve a place in their faith
for the truth of other religious traditions. Third, the two ways should lead to interreligious
dialogue and religious tolerance in Indonesia’s pluralistic society (Kersten 2016, 225–228;
Munawar-Rachman 2010, 523–541). However, the intellectuals do not dare to take the
further step of accommodating other religious traditions within their own theology but
keep them on the margins of their religious faith and theology. NRMs such as Gafatar
have crossed this border, as Mushaddeq and Mahful clearly did when they included the
wisdom of Christianity and Judaism in formulating the Milah Abraham. Generally speak-
ing, NRMs have a tendency to oﬀer religious syncretism and are more tolerant about
taking in diverse elements of diﬀerent religions (Mayer 2011). As Dawson (1998a, 139)
puts it: ‘ … the new religious consciousness is remarkably more syncretistic, accepting
of relativism, and tolerant of other religious perspectives and systems than the religions
dominant in the West in the past’.
Furthermore, NRMs in Indonesia have a critical attitude towards Islamic hegemony,
while criticism by Muslim intellectuals of their own religious tradition does not go
outside the boundaries of their faith. NRMs are courageous in oﬀering compromises
between the conﬂicting theological diﬀerences between Christianity, Judaism and Islam,
while conventional theologians and intellectuals are not. NRMs also oﬀer another dimen-
sion of criticism in considering why and how Muslims remain behind followers other reli-
gious traditions. It is also noteworthy that NRM leaders have experience as both insiders
and outsiders of Islam. Mahful, for instance, was an Islamic scholar and educated in
pesantren, but since joining Mushaddeq and believing in Mushaddeq’s messengerhood,
Mahful has stepped outside Islam, or has simply apostatized. Likewise, Mushaddeq was
a Muslim but, as he declares his prophethood, he too has apostatized from Islam.
Muslim scholars are only insiders. Experiencing two diﬀerent positions as outsiders and
insiders gives Mushaddeq and Mahful more freedom to criticize Islam and oﬀer alterna-
tive religious views on Islam. They are free to formulate the alternative solution of return-
ing to the religion of Abraham, which is more primordial and inclusive than identifying
with only one religious tradition, such as Islam.
The issue of identity is also shown in this call by Mushaddeq for a return to the religion
of Abraham. After observing the emergence of some NRMs in the context of globalization
and the modern world, Dawson asserts:
In the modern world identity is fragmented or at least pluralized. Either way, for many,
having a meaningful identity at all has become problematic. In the face of this, so the argu-
ment runs, the proliferating new religions provide a holistic sense of self, in theory and in
practice, that transcends the constellation of limited instrumental roles recognized by
modern mass society. (Dawson 1998a, 137)
The current globalizing world has led the Muslim community to experience multiple iden-
tities in many modern nation states. Between the religious claim of Islamic universalism
and local or regional identity, Muslims are faced with how to deﬁne themselves (Bowen
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1998; Hassan 2006). Progressive Muslim intellectuals, such as AbdurrachmanWachid and
Nurcholish Madjid, stress the national identity of Indonesian Muslims, coining the term
‘Indonesian Islam’ (Majid 2008; Makin 2017c). This effort is also known as pribumisasi
Islam (indigenization of Islam) (Wahid 1998; Baso 2002), which is also developing in
the area of ﬁqh (Islamic jurisprudence) (Feener 2002; Muhtadi 2005) and tafsīr
(qur’anic hermeneutics) (Setiawan 2012). While Muslim intellectuals point out the impor-
tance of the Indonesian context and identity in interpreting Islam, Mushaddeq gives Indo-
nesian identity priority over religious and spiritual experience. This can be seen in his
emphasis on the greatness of Nusantara in the past. He aims to awaken the spirit of patri-
otism to recreate Indonesia’s lost glory. For Mushaddeq, Nusantara will become the centre
of world civilization and religious tradition, and a similar prophecy is made by Lia Eden
(Makin 2016a).
Notes
1. By ‘Islamic orthodoxy’ I mean here conservative Sunni Islam in which many call upon
Muslims to strictly follow Islamic norms. Islamic conservatism often comes with a call to
return to the Qur’an and Prophetic tradition (Sunna) and to purge non-Islamic practices.
In Indonesia, the MUI (Indonesian Ulama Council), founded in 1975, promotes and
guards this orthodoxy. During the reform period, radical and conservative Islamist ideol-
ogies, such as the FPI (Islamic Front Defender), FUI (Islamic Community Forum) and
HTI (Hizbut Tahrir of Indonesian), supported the stance of the MUI.
2. According to Riis (2007, 2), pluralism refers to ‘a recognition of multiplicity in society and as
a precondition for individual choice and freedom’. On the other hand, Bender and Klassen
(2010, 8) deﬁne pluralism as an ‘active seeking of understanding across lines of diﬀerence’. In
Indonesia, pluralism is interpreted as ‘an open, inclusivistic, liberal understanding of Islam’
(Barton 1997, 344), an understanding that is promoted by Muslim intellectuals from Nurch-
olish Madjid to Abdurrahman Wahid (Makin 2016a, 12).
3. Information also gathered from my ﬁrst interview with Giri. Yogyakarta, 13 March 2017.
4. Information gathered from my ﬁrst interview with Momo. Jakarta, 30 January 2017.
5. Information also gathered from my second interview with Giri. Yogyakarta, 31 March 2017.
6. Two major organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) with a traditionalist tendency and
Muhammadiyah with a modernist tendency, dominate the Indonesian Muslim community,
despite the fact that many more conservative groups, such as FPI, PKS (Prosperous Justice
Party) and HTI, played important public roles during the reform period. The traditionalist
group has strong roots in traditional boarding schools (pesantren), whereas the modernists
have established various modern schools, universities and hospitals. The modernists promote
the puriﬁcation and reformation of Islamic teachings, whereas the traditionalists preserves
local culture. However, the modernists are now trapped in conservatism, while the tradition-
alists show more ideological openness.
7. Information gathered from my second interview with Momo. Jakarta, 4 February 2017.
8. Information gathered from my ﬁrst interview with Giri. Yogyakarta, 13 March 2017.
9. Interview with Mushaddeq. Cipinang prison, Jakarta, 28 August 2017.
10. Information gathered from interviews with Mushaddeq and Hawary M. Cipinang prison,
Jakarta, 28 August 2017.
11. Information gathered from an interview with Mushaddeq. Cipinang prison, Jakarta, 28
August 2017.
12. Sabdo Palon and Naya Genggong are two mythical ﬁgures in Javanese society, believed to be
the guardians of Javanese culture. They appear in many ﬁctional, spiritual and mystical works
(Achmad 2011; Hadiluwih 2010; Hardiyanto 2006; Kresna and Parjiati 2012).
13. Ronggowarsito is a Javanese poet and mystic whose fame lies in his prophecy and social criti-
cism of a ‘crazy era/zaman edan’. His syncretism between Islam and Javanese culture has
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become the subject of many studies (Purwadi and Ranggawarsita 2004; Ruslan 2012; Simuh
1988).
14. Interview with Mushaddeq. Cipinang prison, Jakarta, 28 August 2017.
15. Interview with Mushaddeq. Cipinang prison, Jakarta, 28 August 2017.
16. Information gathered from my second interview with Momo. Jakarta, 4 February 2017.
17. Most Muslims believe that Abraham had two wives, Sarah and Hagar. Sarah gave birth to Isaac,
who became the forefather of the Israelites, whereas Hagar delivered Ishmael, the forefather of
the Arabs. However, Mushaddeq and Mahful refer to Genesis 25.1–6: ‘Abraham had taken
another wife, whose name was Keturah. She bore him Zimran, Jokshan, Medan, Midian,
Ishbak and Shuah. Jokshan was the father of Sheba and Dedan; the descendants of Dedan
were the Ashurites, the Letushites and the Leummites. The sons of Midian were Ephah,
Epher, Hanok, Abida and Eldaah. All these were descendants of Keturah. Abraham left every-
thing he owned to Isaac. But while he was still living, he gave gifts to the sons of his concubines
and sent them away from his son Isaac to the land of the east’ (Muis 2016, 43).
18. Tarumanegara was a fourth-century Hindu kingdom in Bogor, West Java. An inscription
found in the Citarum River displays the footprint of King Purnawarman, who claimed to rep-
resent the god Vishnu.
19. No historical records or archeological evidence explain the existence of the kingdom of
Kandis.
20. According to a Chinese source, the Buddhist monk Yijing of the Tang dynasty, the Melayu or
Dharmasraya kingdom predated and was annexed by Sriwijaya.
21. This eighth–twelfth-century Buddhist kingdom has become a source of national pride and a
symbol of Indonesian history predating Majapahit. The greatness and glory of the marine
kingdom is presented in many history textbooks from elementary to university level.
22. Historical records and archeological evidence are too scarce to explain the existence of the
Tulang Bawang kingdom.
23. This Perlak refers to the ninth-century sultanate of Peureulak.
24. This refers to the thirteenth–sixteenth-century Samudra Pasai sultanate on the north coast of
Sumatra.
25. Panjalu may refer to either the twelfth-century Hindu kingdom in East Java or another thir-
teenth-century kingdom with the same name in West Java.
26. Singasari is a thirteenth-century Hindu-Buddhist kingdom in East Java, whose kings were
revered and claimed to be the forefathers of the kings of Majapahit.
27. Mahapahit was the greatest Hindu-Buddhist kingdom in the archipelago of Indonesia in East
Java and lasted from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century. In modern Indonesia, it serves as
a symbol of national unity.
28. All of these names refer to various sultanates in the archipelago of Indonesia from the six-
teenth to twentieth century.
29. Information also gathered from my second interview with Momo. Jakarta, 4 February 2017.
30. The term ‘syncretism’ in this article refers to the combination or blending of the practices of
two or more religious traditions. Such syncretic practices are commonly found in many local
religious traditions across Indonesia, and Javanese practices of Islam show this tendency. An
illustration of syncretism is the partaking of slameten (communal meal) with some Arabic
Islamic prayers and Javanese Hindu-Buddhist mantras.
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